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The overall strategy of Lycan’s paper is to distinguish three kinds of 
conditional assertion theories, and then to show, in order, how they are 
variously afflicted by a set of problems. The three kinds of theory were 
the Quine-Rhinelander theory (or the Simple Illocutionary theory), The 
Semanticized Quine-Rhinelander, and the No Truth Value theory (or 
NTV). This strategy offers considerable clarity, but it comes at a cost, 
for what I take to be the best version of a conditional assertion theory 
contains core parts of all three theories. In what follows, I will suggest 
that many of the objections offered by Lycan can be dealt when all the 
pieces are taken into consideration at the same time. But I will also 
suggest that a refined version of what Lycan called the Immediate 
Implausibility objection does show us that the conditional assertion 
theory is false. 
Conditional Speech Acts 
Before we can say how a conditional assertion theory can deal with Lycan’s 
objections, we need to know what a conditional speech act is or could be. This 
is especially pressing since Lycan seems to think that there are no conditional 
speech acts, or at least doubts that the conditionality of conditional questions, 
 
* This paper was originally presented as a commentary to Bill Lycan’s Keynote 
address at the “What ‘If’? Perspectives on Conditionals”” at University of 
Connecticut, Storrs, 2006. Lycan’s paper “Conditional-Assertion Theories of 
Conditionals” has since been published in J.J. Thomson (ed.), Content and Modality 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
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commands, requests, bets, and so forth is of the kind that is needed for a 
conditional assertion theory of declarative conditionals.  
 The kind of speech act conditionality that Lycan explicitly acknowledges 
is the kind where the locutionary content of the main clause of a conditional 
is defective unless the antecedent is true. 
 
(1) If Sheila owns a heavy overcoat, please borrow it for me. 
 
You obviously cannot borrow something that doesn’t exist, so the main clause 
of (1) cannot express a request unless the antecedent is true. But such 
explanations are available in only a few of the cases that are intuitively 
understood as conditional speech acts. Consider the case of a mother’s order, 
from Edgington: 
 
(2) If you go out, wear your coat. 
 
The child can presumably wear his coat even if he doesn’t go out: the request 
clearly isn’t cancelled in that way.  
 In Edgington’s story, the child cannot find his coat and stays indoors not 
to disobey the order that would be effected if he were to go out. Lycan 
responds that he cannot see the difference between not disobeying and 
obeying: the child is simply obeying the order. It is easy to sympathize with 
that reaction, and it is clear enough why one wants to say that the boy did 
obey his mother. He has intentionally refrained from acting in a way that 
would be disobedient. But this doesn’t carry over to the next example: 
 
(3) If Janet is coming to the party, please keep Ted away from the 
wine. 
 
For all we know, the addressee might very well be able to keep Janet from 
the party. But the speaker has expressed no preference that can be satisfied 
by keeping Janet from the party: that was not the communicative purpose of 
the request. The communicative purpose, it seems, only concerns the case in 
which Janet is actually coming to the party. 
 I believe that this is the key to understanding conditional speech acts. 
What we intuitively take to be a conditional speech act is a sincere utterance 
of a sentence that 
(A) has a communicative purpose that can only be achieved given some 
condition, P, such that 
(B) the utterance doesn’t presuppose that P holds. 
The normal communicative success of ordinary unconditional speech acts 
always relies on a number of conditions, but these conditions are all 
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presupposed when we make these speech acts. Not so for conditional speech 
acts: here, the antecedent condition is not presupposed. 
 I have used imperative conditionals for illustration here. The conventional 
communicative purpose of imperatives, of course, is to bring the addressee to 
perform the indicated action. In the cases of imperative conditionals just 
mentioned, the performance of the indicated action depends on the 
antecedent, but the antecedent isn’t presupposed. The same notion of a 
conditional speech act can be told about money bets, the conventional 
communicative purpose of which is that the pot is distributed among the 
people who bet on the winning proposition. It can also be applied to at least 
some conditional interrogatives, as in (4), for example: 
 
(4) Before I know what to say to him, I need to know the following. 
Did John drop the vase? And if he dropped it, does he have 
insurance? 
 
The defining communicative purpose of a question is to get an answer, and it 
certainly isn’t obvious that the speaker has expressed any interest in learning 
whether John has insurance in case he didn’t drop the vase. However, our use 
of conditional interrogatives is not in general restricted like this. Take: 
 
(5) If I miss the five o’clock, will the ticket be good for the next 
departure? 
 
Uttering (5), a speaker presumably wants his question answered whether the 
antecedent turns out to be true or not. My feeling is that most conditional 
interrogatives are like this. What, then, about conditional declaratives? 
The Conditional Assertion Theory of Declarative Conditionals 
Let us call the hypothesis that declarative conditionals are conventional 
means of making conditional assertions the “conditional assertion theory of 
declarative conditionals”, or “CA” for short. According to CA, the conventional 
communicative purpose of declarative conditionals would be that the 
addressee accepts the consequent given that the antecedent is true. The 
purpose can be fulfilled only if the antecedent is true, but the antecedent is 
not presupposed when declarative conditionals are used to make conditional 
statements. 
 Caveat: Stephen Barker (“Towards a Pragmatic Theory of ’If’”, 
Philosophical Studies 79 1995, pp. 185-211) says interesting things about 
how to accommodate non-conditional conditionals in a conditional assertion 
theory, in effect generalizing the account to conditions that are unnecessary 
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for satisfying the assertive purpose, but necessary for producing a felicitous 
speech-act: “I bought some cookies if you will be hungry later”, “He dealt with 
it, if you know what I mean”. I will ignore those here, concentrating on cases 
where the consequent doesn’t seem to be straightforwardly asserted. 
 Here are some fairly straightforward consequences of CA:  
 Conventional Truth-Conditions: If a declarative conditional is used to 
make a conditional assertion, then something true has been asserted 
just when antecedent and consequent are both true and something 
false has been asserted just when the antecedent is true but the 
consequent false. If CA were correct, declarative conditionals would be 
conventionally used to make conditional assertions, and it would thus 
make sense to talk about this as giving conventional truth-conditions 
of declarative conditionals.  
 Focus on assessment conditions rather than truth-conditions: Most 
interesting cases where we assess whether to accept a declarative 
indicative conditional are cases where we do not know whether its 
antecedent is true or not. Consequently, what we assess when we 
assess indicative conditionals in order to decide whether to accept 
them or not, is not whether their conventional truth-conditions hold or 
not, but whether the doxastic or epistemic prerequisites for asserting 
them are satisfied. A corollary of this is that our intuitions concerning 
the logic of conditionals are similarly tuned to assertability rather 
than truth. Depending on how much weight we put on this condition, 
we might downplay conventional truth-conditions and market CA as 
NTV. But I won’t say more about that. 
Conditions of relevance: If declarative conditionals are conventional 
means for making conditional assertions, they will bring a 
conventional assumption of relevance. There is no point in making a 
conditional assertion rather than a straightforward one unless the 
antecedent cannot be taken for granted and, for example, (a) one’s 
confidence in the consequent depends on one’s confidence in the 
antecedent (call these cases of “positive” relevance) or (b) someone 
thinks, or could think that the antecedent would undermine 
confidence in the consequent (call these cases of “negative” relevance). 
Expressions of Conditional Belief: If declarative conditionals are 
conventionally used to make conditional assertions, then they will 
conventionally express conditional belief just as ordinary categorical 
declaratives express categorical beliefs. The reason for this is simply 
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that conditional belief is the minimal doxastic prerequisite for making 
or accepting a conditional assertion. 
In the last part of my commentary, I will look at how this combination of 
features fares with Lycan’s objections. I will suggest that most of the 
objections that Lycan list look rather weak when directed at this combined 
view, but that one family is substantially strengthened. 
Responding to Objections 
Begin with the TT objection, which states that, contrary to Jeffrey’s and 
Belnap’s accounts, not any two truths, P and Q can be combined to yield an 
acceptable conditional if P, Q. Take:  
 
(6) If Manhattan is an island, many people in this room will have 
breakfast tomorrow. 
 
It seems unacceptable, even though both antecedent and consequent surely 
is. This objection loses all or most of its force once we take into account that 
conditional assertions will come with a conventionalized presupposition of 
relevance. Now, Lycan acknowledges the possibility of this kind of 
explanation and rejects it. But he gives no argument as far as I can tell. 
 The same reply goes for the objection that being in a state of conditional 
belief is insufficient for accepting the corresponding conditional. According to 
CA, conditional belief is the doxastic prerequisite for making a certain 
conditional assertion. But to find it acceptable to encode this belief in a 
declarative conditional, we must also see how conventionalized conditions of 
relevance can be satisfied. CA can thus explain the fact that I am unwilling to 
accept (6) even though I believe that many people in this room will have 
breakfast tomorrow conditional on Manhattan’s being an Island (believing 
both simpliciter). 
 Next, consider the objection from contraposition. The problem that Lycan 
reminds us of is that neither semanticized accounts nor NTV validates 
contraposition. But this doesn’t look very serious once we take into account 
that contraposition doesn’t seem generally plausible for declarative 
conditionals. For example, contraposition doesn’t work for:  
 
(7) If it rains, the game will (still) not be cancelled. 
hence 
(8) If the game will be cancelled, it doesn’t rain. 
 
Nor does it work for: 
 
(9) I bought some biscuits if you’re hungry. 
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hence 
(10) If you’re not hungry, I didn’t buy any biscuits. 
  
But it works for: 
 
(11) If it is raining, the game will be cancelled. 
hence 
(12) If the game isn’t cancelled, it isn’t raining. 
 
The cases in which it works are cases in which the truth of the antecedent 
would be a sure sign of the truth of the consequent. In such cases, whatever 
makes it the case that the truth of the antecedent would be a sure sign of the 
truth of the consequent also typically makes it the case that the negation of 
the consequent is a sure sign of the negation of the antecedent. And CA has 
no problem explaining why declarative conditionals are acceptable when the 
antecedent would be a sure sign of the consequent. So the Contraposition 
objection seems to be deflected rather easily. In fact, I think that the 
restrictions on contraposition strengthen CA, rather than the other way 
around. 
 The disjunction objection can be treated in almost exactly the same way. 
Not all declarative conditionals seem to be synonymous to disjunctions, but 
those who do are cases where the negation of one disjunct is a sure sign of the 
truth of the other. And for the same reason, the Entailment objection carries 
little weight. Having grounds for accepting a true universal generalization 
guarantees having grounds for accepting a corresponding conditional, even if 
the conditional doesn’t follow logically from the generalization.  
 I will skip the Subjunctive Parallel objection, because I am unable to say 
much of value in a few minutes, and because I believe that Dorothy 
Edgington will have better things to say about that issue tomorrow, anyway. 
That leaves the objection from Immediate Implausibility and trouble with 
conditionals embedded in antecedents of other conditionals, or in 
disjunctions, or as the propositional objects of actions or attitudes. 
 Lycan’s objection from Immediate Implausibility departs from the fact 
that many, if not all, cases of declarative conditionals clearly do seem to 
assert something, even when it isn’t clear that the antecedent is true. For 
example, if I am telling someone that the vase they are holding will break if it 
is dropped, it certainly seems that I have asserted something, and similarly if 
I tell someone that he will have to buy the vase if he breaks it. That might 
seem like a strong objection indeed to a conditional assertion theory, for it 
goes straight to its heart. 
 The hope for the defense of CA is to explain away the appearance of 
assertion, and that might well be possible. For example, it might be 
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suggested that whether or not the antecedent of a declarative conditional 
turns out to be true, communication using conditional assertions will depend 
on the communication of conditional belief. In order for the hearer to be ready 
to accept what is asserted by a declarative conditional if the antecedent turns 
out to be true, she has to form the relevant conditional belief – there are no 
“ifs” about that. That could explain the impression of unconditionality. 
 Of course, the same is true about the case of conditional commands. In 
order to be prepared to obey a conditional command, I need to form a 
conditional intention. However, in this case, the further step to actually 
performing the action should the antecedent turn out to be true is 
phenomenologically salient. In the case of conditional assertions, by contrast, 
the move from forming the conditional belief to forming an unconditional 
belief in the consequent is considerably more subtle: the transformation from 
conditional belief to belief simpliciter. For that reason, we might simply fail to 
notice the conditionality of the further communicative purpose of conditional 
assertions. It thus seems that CA has a response to the objection from 
Immediate Implausibility. 
The Independent Point Objection 
However, using our notion of a conditional speech act, we can sketch a 
stronger, although perhaps less immediate argument. The problem with the 
conditional assertion theory is that it simply isn’t true that the conventional 
communicative point of uttering a declarative conditional is that the hearer 
should accept the consequent if the antecedent holds. Rather than being the 
communicative point of declarative conditionals, that is just one of many 
possible communicative points all of which relies on the unconditional 
communicative purpose of making the addressee accept the conditional. 
 What I take to be the crucial aspect of the cases that make CA 
immediately implausible is that the general conventional communicative 
point is independent of whether the antecedent is true or not. Call this the 
Independent Point objection. Telling someone that the vase will break if 
dropped is to tell him something that we think can be used for a variety of 
purposes: not only to infer that it is broken from the fact it has been dropped, 
but also that it hasn’t been dropped when it isn’t broken, or to make someone 
else break it, or to prevent it from being broken, or to make someone who is 
familiar with it think that it has been broken by making her think that it has 
been dropped. And so on. Similarly, telling someone that the vase doesn’t 
break even if it is dropped, tells us something that can be used for a variety of 
purposes, not just or even primarily for the purpose of coming to think that 
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the vase isn’t broken. If this is true, CA is false: declarative conditionals are 
not, conventionally, means of making conditional assertions. And if the 
corollaries to CA – conventional truth-conditions; focus on assessment 
conditions rather than truth-conditions; conditions of relevance; and 
expressions of conditional belief – are nevertheless true, they are not true 
because of CA. 
